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-
- NEWSLETTER NUMBER 11
- **********************************************************************
- Another festive, info-glutted, tongue-in-cheek training manual
- provided solely for the entertainment of the virus programmer,
- security specialist, casual bystander or PC hobbyist interested in
- the particulars - technical or otherwise - of cybernetic data
- replication and/or mutilation. Jargon free, too.
- EDITED BY URNST KOUCH, late December 1992
- **********************************************************************
-
- TOP QUOTE: "God Bless America and cry 'freedom' as you punch
- me on the nose."
- --Harriet Timson in the December
- 1992 issue of Virus News Intn'l.
-
-
- IN THIS ISSUE: NOOZ . . . product reviews: AVLAB 1.0 and
- Victor Charlie 5.0 . . . FICTUAL FACT/FACTUAL FICTION . . .
- IN THE READING ROOM: POPULAR SCIENCE SEARCHES FOR BATCHFILE
- VIRUSES and "GATES" - A GOOD DOORSTOP . . . Leech-ZModem .
- . . POPOOLAR SCIENCE virus . . . HITLER virus . . . NECRO
- virus . . . LITTLE MESS virus . . . Edwin Cleton's software
- psychobabble . . . DAVE BARRY v. MICHELANGELO virus . . . the
- usual clever (or dumb - depending how you look at it) wit . . .
-
-
- ************************************************************
- NOOZ: OUTGOING PREZ URGED TO LOOK TO INTEGRITY OF WHITE
- HOUSE DATA
- ************************************************************
-
- Reuters News Service reports that two U.S. senators, Democrats
- John Glenn and David Pryor, have urged George Bush to prevent
- destruction of White House computer records during the transition
- to the Bill Clinton administration.
-
- In a letter to the lame-duck, the senators claimed that sensitive
- data faces "a significant risk of destruction."
-
- The astute reader is encouraged to read between the lines
- and jump to the conclusion that the Democrats are concerned
- about the mutilation of electronic files generated by the
- National Security Council during Iran-Contra.
-
- In any case, worried Democrats are advised to be on the lookout
- for unexplained junkets to Colombia and vieled references to the
- "Ghost of la Catedral" during the waning days of the Bush
- presidency.
- ***************************************************************
-
- -*-
-
- Page 1
-
-
-
-
- *****************************************************************
- CONSECRATED PSYCHOBABBLE: EDWIN CLETON's CODE EXECUTION SIMULATOR,
- OR: HOW -*NOT*- TO WRITE A SOFTWARE MANUAL!
- *****************************************************************
-
- Last issue's readers may remember a passing infoblip concerning
- the naming of one Edwin Cleton as the Fidonet Virus echo moderator.
- In related news, a dedicated reader dug a Cleton/Saesoft shareware
- anti-virus program known as the Code Execution Simulator (CES)
- out of the trash and passed it on to the Crypt Newsletter.
- From what we could tell, it was "supposed" to be a $40 cash money
- heuristic scanner. In any case, CES refused to function at the Crypt
- editorial offices in any logical manner. (Could be someone's
- pulling our leg! Hah!) And the accompanying
- documentation was, well . . . you can read it for yourself:
-
-
- -=[ravings starts here]=-
- CES (Tm) Code Execution Simulator.
- =*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*==
- "Gather enough information and the solution will be obvious."
- S.B. 1988
-
- "A virus can NOT be detected BEFORE execution, it can only be
- detected AFTER or WHILE execution, which is at the moment to
- late, however, to detect anything for that matter, you need to
- execute it first before there will be *anything* to detect."
- E.C. 1990
-
- "Mate(s) it simply makes sense, make a backup..."
-
- The stages of development;
- =*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*===*==
- The object is to create rules related behaviour, consistent to
- such an instruction or event of instructions in order to deter-
- mine if *something* is happening, the order of what this *some-
- thing* is, is yet to be defined by the sub-rules who are (to be)
- generated out of the strain that started the initial behaviour.
-
- Consistent rule related behaviour is *never* predefined, thus
- the object or statement 'will never work well enough' is irre-
- levant to it's initial base, whether or not *a* rule 'works' is
- of no concern to the CES model, for the intention is to create
- such *working* rules related to any behaviour it will derive, if
- not, the initial rule is dropped and this has yet to happen.
-
- To create such rules, there base must be optained at the lowest
- level and gradualy go upwards to become *ideal*, each rule and
- the sub-rules related must be dedicated to one single predefined
- *instuction* or event of such instructions.
-
- The lowest level based rule *must* effect it's sub-rules or if
- and when needed, create such, a sub-rule will and can eventually
- link with other sub-rules, somewhat like a neural network, once
- each level expands and thus also there related strains into the
- *rule network*, some point must be given to hold it at a given
- time, backtracking each level will then (and only then) result
- in *a* logical deducting 'intelligent' rule based CES system.
-
-
- Page 2
-
- The CES model is not a debugger, if *a* program executes, it
- will do the same inside CES's environment, undocumented instruc-
- tions are of no concern, as they *are* documented somewhere and
- can be included along the line they appear, if not, CES will
- simply halt requesting manual instructions, which in turn can be
- solved on the same line they appear.
-
- The *model* should provide in it's own complexity to amphase the
- creation of direct logic solutions to any given problem, or
- abort complexity.
-
- Scanning for prototype of code is a waste of time, recording and
- detecting behaviour isn't, yet you have to define normal and
- abnormal behaviour.
- -=[ravings end here]=-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------
- Hah??? "Amphase"? How about "aphasic"! Don't be frightened readers!
- Yes, indeed, you are right! It IS impenetrable crap!
-
- As a wise man from Holland once said, "Kannitverstann!"
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
- *****************************************************************
- CAIRO RESEARCH'S AVLAB 1.0: A PRODUCT WALKTHROUGH
- *****************************************************************
-
- Tired of lunatic contributors to Virus-L and the Fido Virus
- echos sniping at your carefully reasoned analyses like junkyard
- dogs tearing at pieces of rotten, greasy meat? Then, Cairo
- Research's AVLab 1.0 is just the thing for you - a program designed
- to buttress your arguments over the efficacy of anti-virus scanners
- with the cold, unforgiving steel of statistics.
-
- In its broadest function, AVLab works like a shell, automating
- scan testing of virus-laden directories and tabulating the
- results. Throw 300 virus samples into a test directory, add
- a scanner of interest (Cairo has already supplied 5 slots
- for the more common products: SCAN, TBScan, F-PROT, etc.)
- and use the drop down menus on the interface to begin testing.
-
- AVLab manufactures a result, like so:
-
-
-
- Product Name: Hits Miss HitVersion
- ────────────────────────────────────────┬────┬────┬──────┬──────┬───────────
- McAfee Associate's ViruScan │ 78│ 5│ 93.98│90.99 │ Best!
- Solomon Toolkit's FindVirus │ 70│ 13│ 84.34│4.31 │
- Leprechaun's Doctor │ 57│ 26│ 69.00│3.76 │ Worst!
- │ │ │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ │
- ────────────────────────────────────────┼────┼────┼──────┼──────┼───────────
- Averages ---> │ 68│ 15│ 82.44│ │
- ────────────────────────────────────────┴────┴────┴──────┴──────┴───────────
- 83 samples in 1 directories
-
-
- Page 3
-
- Little could be more straightforward. Of course, you're left
- to ponder the meaning of it yourself; factors like
- how random were the choices from your virus library, how
- reliable the results taken from a scan of less than 2,000
- MtE samples, how out-of-date the scanner (Leprechaun 3.76 is
- over a year old. Not a bad score, wouldn't you say?) - all
- must be considered. AVlab will get you into the ballpark,
- though, and keep you waist deep in e-mail from the matrix
- as long as you let it.
-
- The only hard part about using AVLab is initially programming
- the command line switches to software not already included in
- the pre-configured slots. And that's trifling.
-
- AVlab will also read those VIRSCAN.DAT files that come with
- a few European a-v scanners, presenting them in a
- scrollable database far prettier than the straight original
- text. You can add your own note to each virus in the
- database, too. Strangely, this was where the only bug in my
- version cropped up. I added a note to one specimen and it
- bled through to every virus listing in the database.
-
- The program is well-mannered, its documentation brief and to
- the point. AVLab's an unique example of a "niche"
- product: Perhaps just the thing to help you persuade a
- potential client that you're ready to go into the anti-virus
- scanner certification business. For a fee, of course. ;-)
-
- It's $30 cash money as registered shareware from Cairo;
- the same folks produce a virus-info BBS door and a few
- direct-action research viruses featuring interesting encrypted
- messages like "Rock o' the Marne, sir!"
-
- AVLab 1.00 is supplied at the Cairo Research support BBS's:
- Under the Nile! 9600v.32 1:3613/12
- Backwoods BBS 9600USR-DS 1:3613/10
-
- ***************************************************************
-
-
- ***************************************************************
- MORE HACKER CRACKDOWN: THOSE WHO DON'T REMEMBER THE PAST
- TEND TO REPEAT IT
- ***************************************************************
-
- In a December news piece from the Associated Press, Kevin Poulsen,
- a former Silicon Valley computer worker, was reported as
- charged with stealing Air Force secrets that allegedly included a
- targeting list - a computer tape containing an order for a
- military exercise code-named Cabre Dragon 88.
-
- The 27-year-old Los Angeles resident was named in a 14-count
- indictment that includes a charge of gathering defense information.
- The punishment associated with conviction calls for 7 to 10 years
- in prison.
-
- An unnamed colleague faces lesser charges of unlawful use of
- telephone access devices, illegal wiretapping and conspiracy.
-
- Poulsen's lawyer, Paul Meltzer, claims the data secured by his
- client was not sensitive and that it was reclassified by government
- officials to secure an easy prosecution.
-
- Page 4
-
-
- Poulsen's prior history, according to AP, included 1989 charges
- for stealing telephone access codes from a Pacific Bell office,
- accessing Pacific Bell computers, gathering of unpublished phone
- numbers for the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco; trade of
- stolen telephone access codes and eavesdropping. He was free until
- April 1991, when a tip generated by a TV show led to his
- arrest. Poulson has not yet been tried for these charges;
- a court date is set for March.
-
- Without knowimg much more about the particulars of this news
- piece or Poulsen, it is still worth going over the alleged theft
- of a military targeting list in slightly greater detail. Consider
- the value of any stolen strategic or tactical (Presumably nuclear:
- when the Air Force uses the euphemism "targeting list" it is
- almost always in the context of nuclear war-fighting.)
- targeting list with these points in mind:
-
- 1. The U.S. is not at war and faces no obvious enemy.
-
- 2. Familiarity with any number of publications
- on Air Force tactical and strategic planning leads one
- to realize that any targeting list generated by
- military planners tends to contain several hundred
- to thousands of points. Armed with that knowledge,
- any citizen equipped with a good tourist map
- could generate his own plan which would be expected to
- have considerable overlap with any military list.
- What "secret" value do any of these lists have?
-
- It is tempting to think of Poulsen's stolen list as
- another probable "E911 BellSouth"-type document. Worth about
- $20, if anyone would be interested in it.
- ***************************************************************
-
-
-
- ***************************************************************
- REVIEWING VICTOR CHARLIE 5.0 FROM BANGKOK SECURITY ASSOCIATES:
- NOW, REPEAT AFTER ME, "OWATTA GOO SIAM!"
- ***************************************************************
-
- "The World's First Generic Anti-virus Program!" claim Bangkok
- Security Associates of Victor Charlie 5.0. While it would
- never get past the desk of an American adman, it made us
- smile.
-
- Sure, it's a dumb boast. But so what! The PC world is full of
- 'em.
-
- In any case, Victor Charlie works on the premise that all the
- serious viruses of the future will be memory resident. Fair
- enough.
-
- So it offers its body up as bait to a resident virus, using itself
- and two "sentry" executables as targets of infection. When infected,
- Victor Charlie attempts to go on the attack. It grabs a signature
- from one of its infected files, adds it to a generic scanner/
- integrity checker, prompts the user to scan the disk and delete
- files found to be infected or changed, regenerates itself and then
- forces a cold reboot.
-
-
- Page 5
-
- It's not a bad approach. Victor Charlie 5.0 detected, disarmed
- and deleted a raft of resident viruses and files infected by them.
- Jerusalem variants, Npox variants, the Hitler virus (in this issue),
- ARCV's Scroll - all fell quickly to VC 5.0. Sandwich, a marginal
- stealth virus - as were Scroll, Hitler and NPox - was also quickly
- disposed of. Viruses using advanced encryption were slightly more
- successful. The polymorphs Pogue Mahone and and Coffeeshop 2 were
- detected in memory and purged by reboot. Predictably, VC could not
- generate usable signatures from them. The program's back-up, a
- VERY SLOW integrity checker, detected files changed by the
- polymorphs and flagged them. By reading the documentation a more
- doltish user could, in theory, figure out the proper course of
- action.
-
- Victor Charlie's other major feature was its "protection" of
- user-selected programs. Essentially, this translates as: let
- the program make a back-up of your favorites, stash them
- somewhere else on the disk under different names and restore
- them when changes are detected in the originals. Not exactly
- novel, but at least guaranteed an almost 100(null)uccess rate
- when usable.
-
- It provides similar protection for the hard file's system
- area and a utility seemingly analogous to MS-DOS's FDISK /MBR
- option.
-
- The program's Lao-Tse (I couldn't resist this awful pun!) points:
-
- 1. Victor Charlie cedes the playing
- field to direct action viruses. It relies on it's integrity
- checker and self-generated audit of infection trails to
- eliminate them. In light of the speed of the program, this
- is a tedious, frustrating process all out of proportion to
- the actual threat.
-
- 2. VC 5.0 won't detect companion (spawning) viruses.
-
- 3. The program would not generate a "rescue disk" as advertised.
- It flat-out refused to work for us.
-
- 4. And the installation/initialization procedure hinged on
- extended batchfiles which had to be poked and prodded in ways
- not obvious to the average PC user. (I.E., only fanatics
- and programmers - people who don't need this program - would
- get it to function in real world situations.)
-
- Bangkok Security Associates asks for $50 in registry. We don't
- think this is a good buy . . . unless you crave a challenge.
- In fact, its ridiculously priced considering the competition.
- The Crypt recommendations to Bangkok Security Associates (remember,
- advice is often worth exactly what you pay for it): knock $15 off
- the fee, make the install program work, lay off the Thai sticks
- when composing the documentation and see us in 6 months, dudes.
- **************************************************************
-
- --------------------------------------------------------------
- FILE LEECHING MADE EASY: A HALLOWED TRADITION SERVED BY THE
- PUBLIC DOMAIN TECHNOLOGY OF LEECH-ZMODEM
- ______________________________________________________________
-
- Until now, you may have been at the mercy of your local "warez
- dood" - beholden to his every whim for the file points YOU
-
- Page 6
-
- NEEDED like life's blood itself for your obsessive-compulsive
- piracy habit. But now, you can strike back with a tool previously
- used only by the very "elyte"! In the grass-roots tradition of
- individual empowerment, Crypt Newsletter supplies YOU with
- the Leech-Zmodem, a tool designed to optimize your neo-psychotic
- problem, at the same time creating bookkeeping headaches for
- pirate BBS's everywhere!
-
- LZMCNF.SCR and LZM.SCR will recreate the Leech-Zmodem programs
- for you. And, with the help of the pre-made batchfiles, QMOD.BAT
- and PCOMM.BAT (see additional documentation in endnotes), we give
- you the complete drop-in package of Leech-Zmodem for those using
- the popular ProComm Plus and Qmodem Pro telecommunications software.
- Place these files in your telecommunications directory, disable the
- auto-Zmodem download option if it's turned on, and you're ready
- to leech by calling the program from your ProComm or Qmodem menu!
-
- Configuring Leech-Zmodem couldn't be simpler. Go to your
- DOS prompt in the Leech-Zmodem directory. Type: LZMCNF.
- The configuration program will come up and you will answer a
- few simple questions as to color preference, bps rate and
- COM port address. When asked about method for "cancellation,"
- choose "s" for single-file download. Now you are ready
- to go, go, go!
-
- How does Leech-Zmodem work? Dial your local "warez board,"
- preferably one where you already have an account but, perhaps,
- not the file points you think you so richly deserve.
-
- Select a "ware." Pick one that will use up almost
- all your precious file points! Go ahead! Instruct the "warez
- board" to send it. Activate your Leech-Zmodem (here you should
- have ALREADY de-activated your auto-Zmodem download). The
- colorful Leech-Zmodem menu should appear on your monitor,
- showing you the progress of your transaction. Now watch closely!
- The file is almost finished. What's that? Leech-Zmodem is
- springing into action, squaring the file away while sending a
- bogus error code which instructs the host software that the
- transfer was "aborted." Now, check your file points. They
- are untouched! The host software takes nothing away for "aborted"
- transfers. But you have the file, anyway! Victory is sweet!
- Logoff at once and find another BBS to try it on, now that you've
- got the hang of Leech-Zmodem!
-
- We are sure you see the potential of Leech-Zmodem! Use it knowing
- that we've tested it successfully on a number of popular softwares
- including Telegard, Vision-X, Celerity, PCBoard and WWIV, among
- others. And after reviewing the documentation of these BBS
- packages, we can tell you with some assurance that the authors of
- these programs remain uncognizant of the special challenge posed by
- Leech-Zmodem.
-
- However, a few caveats:
-
- 1. Don't be a chump and throw away your winning hand by attempting
- to download 20 files in one session. Even the densest sysop's
- will be alarmed when they review their daily log and see that
- long audit trail with that curious string of "aborted transfer"
- notations. Spread your attention to many. Use Leech-Zmodem
- strategically, interspersing parasitic behavior with the
- occasional "regular" session.
-
-
- Page 7
-
- 2. Try to avoid using Leech-Zmodem when you've got a hunch that
- the sysop is staring directly at his monitor. While some sysops
- will never grasp what is going on in "real-time," it's unwise
- to walk in harm's way.
-
- 3. If you are confronted by a sysop who has caught on to what
- you are doing, try buying him off by offering him his own copy
- of Leech-Zmodem! Often, this tactic will work.
-
- 4. Leech-Zmodem works fine on public domain, pornography
- and virus exchange BBS's, too. It excels on any system dedicated
- to a "file-server" mentality.
-
- 5. If you have your own BBS, you can protect yourself from Leech-
- Zmodem by using the -S (for SlugBait) command-line switch when
- calling your Omen Technology DSZ Zmodem program. SlugBait was
- designed by Chuck Forsberg to trap programs like Leech-
- Zmodem by putting a notation in the transfer log that the session
- is "questionable" when aborted with the pattern common to Leech-
- Zmodem. If your registered version of the program supports this
- feature, DSZ will tell you when something is rotten in Denmark.
-
- 6. Leech-Zmodem is a one-way program. It will only handle
- Zmodem file transfers from the sending BBS to you.
-
- The history of Leech-Zmodem is spare. The program appeared
- on various underground BBS's about a year ago, so it's
- not particularly new. However, it works and is likely to
- remain effective for some time. Even now, we know of BBS'er's
- who use Leech-Zmodem on an almost daily basis. So, you can thank
- Leech-Zmodem's anonymous author for this "interesting" and
- valuable addition to your hard file.
- **************************************************************
-
- IN THE READING ROOM: POPULAR SCIENCE/POPULAR SCHMIENCE
- **************************************************************
-
- Dateline: A passing comment carried on the winds of the WWIVnet
- from alert reader, Mr. Badger:
-
- Whö : Mr. Badger
- Whéñ: Monday, December 21, 1992 2:09 PM
- ƒròm: Dream World BBS [ASV] (South Carolina)
-
- FYI, there's a little article in the January 1993 Popular
- Science on "Stalking Stealth Viruses". Pretty basic, but one
- quote should win a Sigmund Freud Anal Retentive Award from the
- Crypt Newsletter:
-
- "Viruses threaten to rattle the underlying confidence people
- now have in computers...And if people stop relying on computers,
- that's everybody's problem."
-
- -Peter Tippett, president, Certus International
-
- Sheesh, quotes like that need to be on recruiting posters for
- future hackers.
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------
- Whoah! That got our attention so we rushed out to the nearest
- newstand for our own copy of January's Popular Science. Sure
- enough, an article on "stealth viruses" accompanied by a truly
-
- Page 8
-
- freaked-out piece of artwork and the subhead: "Forget all the
- hype over Michelangelo. 1993 may be the year that a new breed of
- less visible but more sophisticated viruses begin to slip into
- thousands or even millions of PCs."
-
- But you already know the punchline to this story, because you
- swallowed it in March. It's a hook to catch the general reader -
- nowhere does Popular Science deliver any support for the claim.
-
- And the stealth viruses trotted out? Whale, 4096, Joshi,
- NoInt (I suppose), DIR-2, Cascade (a stealth virus?); all well
- characterized programs, all controlled by even the most inept
- anti-virus software. Of course, reporter Christopher O'Malley
- never really gets around to hipping the reader to this fact.
-
- The "Mutating [sic] Engine" is on hand, too. Even Mrs. Urnst Kouch,
- an avowed computer-phobe was startled.
-
- "Mutating Engine?" she asked. "That's not right, izzit?"
-
- To be fair, O'Malley's piece is an earnest, if fumbled, stab at
- good science reporting for a general readership. It's the kind of
- technical news we USED to be able to expect occasionally from our
- better national newspapers rather than the current stream of
- rah-rah "journal article of the week" swill. And we realize, too,
- that the level of technical understanding in the average reader of a
- newstand magazine dictates that he may consider any computer
- virus close kin to a demon.
-
- But even that rationalization pales as an excuse for "dumbed-down"
- work when the reader finally gets around to examining Popular
- Science's version of a demo virus, BFV (for "batch file virus").
-
- "INFECTED BATCH FILES WILL INFECT OTHER BATCH FILES WHEN RUN!"
- warns the magazine ominously. "If an infected batch file were
- to be passed from one user to another, the new user's batch files
- would become virus carriers as well," reporter O'Malley writes.
-
- We were sure this was unadulterated crap, in light of the rest of
- the article and, indeed, BFV.BAT was a flop.
-
- Its "virus" batch file code, in essence was:
-
- FOR %F in (*.BAT) do copy %F + BFV.BAT .
-
- Executing this code as the batchfile, BFV.BAT, in a directory
- full of .BAT files merely mutilates all of them, appending
- the above line to every one. Executing any of the "infected" files
- at once locks the machine into an endless, rather obvious, loop
- as the "infected" .BAT file recursively appends the line in BFV.BAT
- to itself and its companions. (This is due to the way that DOS
- processes the FOR command and the "variables" %F in the set,
- *.BAT. Don't worry about the jargon. Try the experiment and see
- for yourself.)
-
- Further, removing any of the "infected" files to a different
- directory off the machine's path (or a different machine, as
- suggested) results in . . . nothing. None of these files can
- do anything by themselves - hardly virus-like. This
- leads to the next question: Did the reporter even test his
- own "batchfile virus"? Apparently not is the logical answer.
- The science writer, leery of his own batchfile "virus." Well,
-
- Page 9
-
- isn't that just special?
-
- [In any case, the Crypt Newsletter editors have whipped up a
- quick .BATfile "virus" of their own, POPSCI.BAT. In actuality,
- it is a "launcher" for a specially-commissioned-for-this-issue
- "Popoolar Science" virus. Popoolar Science, unlike BFV.BAT, does
- work. It will mutilate your .BAT files, your executables and
- your data in its search for files to infect. And it will spread
- from infected programs to other uninfected files, just like any
- normal virus. You can search for it with a real anti-virus
- program and, in general, watch it do things a number of
- viruses in the wild can do. (See end notes for further details.)]
-
- *****************************************************************
- READING ROOM II: "GATES: HOW MICROSOFT'S MOGUL ETC., ETC., BLAH,
- BLAH, BLAH" by STEPHEN MANES & PAUL ANDREWS (DOUBLEDAY, hardbound,
- $25 cash money)
- *****************************************************************
-
- As you might guess, "Gates" is about Chairman Bill, Bill - the
- brightest man I've ever met, genius Bill, Bill - the master
- convincer, Billion-Dollar Bill, Supercalifragilisticexpialadocious
- Bill. In other words, it's a 500-page blowjob.
-
- Manes and Andrews insist that Gates exerted no editorial control
- over their work. After reading "Gates," this is an unbelievable
- claim. There's one paragraph devoted to Chairman Bill's legendary
- crummy personal hygiene. Bill can't do more than one thing at a
- time while washing his hair, say Manes and Andrews, so he doesn't
- shampoo too often. It's flabbergasting trivia like this that
- sinks "Gates." In spite of "access" - there's no feeling that
- these two clowns know anything more about Microsoft's boss than you
- or me. DESPITE pages and pages worth of Bill coding BASIC,
- Bill having a screaming fit, Bill buying a Porsche, Bill having
- a cat fit, Bill getting ticked at Borland's Philippe Kahn, Bill
- having an apoplectic fit, Bill flying to Armonk, NY; Bill having
- a shit fit, Bill going to ComDex, Bill making his first million,
- Bill having a yelling fit, Bill making his first billion
- (gaaaaaaah!), "Gates" is a dull-to-the-point-of-mind-roasting read
- filled to the gunwales with sickeningly cutesy, purple prose.
-
- If you wanna know about Gates, save $20 and get Robert X. Cringely's
- "Accidental Empires" (Addison-Wesely). Pass on this dreck.
-
-
-
- ****************************************************************
- THIS ISSUE'S SOFTWARE: A CORNUCOPIA OF COMPRESSED ELECTRONIC JOY!
- ****************************************************************
-
- The NECRO (SKULL) virus is included as another example of
- what can be done with the Virus Creation Laboratory and Phalcon/
- SKISM Mass Production Coder. Suprisingly, the most recent version
- of SCAN does not flag files infected by NECRO - revealing that
- either McAfee is slipping or there is more to either code set
- than the mainstream "authorities" would have you believe. We
- think the latter explanation is closer to the truth. You will
- also enjoy the novel manner in which NECRO toggles between being
- a .COMfile appending virus and an .EXE-overwriter: a good example
- of being creative and imaginative within the constraints of
- a simple model.
-
-
- Page 10
-
- Since NECRO is a run-time infector, it is rather easily
- detected by any functional file integrity monitor. To eradicate it,
- delete all files altered by either form of the virus.
-
- The HITLER virus is a product of Demoralized Youth, apparently
- a Scandinavia-based group. It is a large-ish memory resident
- .COM infector which is marginally "stealthy," that is the
- virus subtracts its file size from infected files when the
- PC user employs the "dir" command. You can execute it safely
- with this in mind: .COMfiles are infected upon load, the
- command processor can be successfully infected, and file size
- changes are invisible when the virus is present in memory.
- If the user has the presence of mind to record his machine's free
- memory before the virus is called, a simple MEM /C command will
- reveal the presence of the program - HITLER creates a quite
- noticeable 5k drop in available memory.
-
- HITLER contains no destructive payloads per se. It does, however,
- install its own routine which runs off the machine timer
- tick interrupt.
-
- When conditions are right, a vocal effect - some goon shouting
- "Hitler!" - is sent to the PC internal speaker card.
- It is quite repetive and annoying. On some machines, all that
- is heard is speaker buzz. (See the HITLER virus source
- listing for more notes.)
-
- Interestingly, an highly placed source informs the newsletter
- that the HITLER virus will probably not be called
- that as it finds its way into many anti-virus programs.
- Presumably, it will be renamed to avoid offending those with
- thin skins in Europe, thus keeping it in line with new virus
- nomenclature rules designed to avoid offensive titles.
- (Remember the stink generated about
- CASTLE WOLFENSTEIN.) Aaah, the sociology of computer
- virology never ceases to fascinate.
-
- POPOOLAR SCIENCE is a primitive overwriting virus.
- It is supplied only in the batchfile, POPSCI.BAT., and its A86
- source listing. Experienced Crypt Newsletter readers uncaring of
- the A86 assembler can strip the DEBUG script from POPSCI.BAT
- with any minimally functional text editor and create a separate
- DEBUG script for the virus. POPOOLAR SCIENCE restricts itself
- to its current directory (unless on the path and called from a
- different one), displays an endorsement of Popular Science
- magazine everytime it is executed and overwrites all files
- in the current directory instantly, ruining them if they
- are data and making them copies of POPOOLAR SCIENCE if
- programs. This renders it a nuisance on the same order as the
- much smaller DEFINE and MINISCULE series of viruses. However,
- while easily tracked, POPOOLAR SCIENCE can make a shambles of
- a system quickly and explosively, if stupidly handled. Executing
- the batchfile POPSCI.BAT will cancel the monitor, assemble and
- launch POPOOLAR SCIENCE virus in the current directory. All files
- will be infected in the current directory as soon as the
- message "Popoolar Science Roolz!" is displayed on the screen
- and the user is returned to his command prompt. The virus
- does not check if the file is a program or data; it does not
- check if the program has already been infected. We feel
- none of these features are needed in a kamikaze demo program
- of this nature. [Additionally, the MS-DOS program DEBUG.EXE
- must be present on the path or in its default location for
-
- Page 11
-
- POPSCI.BAT to work.]
-
- LITTLE MESS is a bird of a different feather.
- Produced by the Dutch virus-writing group, TridenT, LITTLE
- MESS has a specific target: the TELIX telecommunications
- program. Written in SALT, TELIX's scripting language,
- LITTLE MESS is a spawning virus attracted to compiled
- applications scripts in the TELIX directory (of which there
- are always two-three laying about). LITTLE MESS renames any
- of these compiled files with an .SLX extension and then makes a
- duplicate of itself renamed as the script it is replacing.
- When the infected script is used, LITTLE MESS quickly does
- its thing and then calls the .SLX script to complete its
- task. When all the compiled TELIX scripts are infected,
- further use during a TELIX session will cause LITTLE MESS
- to flash a "Legalize Marijuana! -TridenT" message
- on the screen, boxed out in the usual TELIX message form every
- one in eight executions.
-
- Of course, LITTLE MESS cannot spread outside of the TELIX
- program or find its way onto another machine unless friends
- exchange compiled scripts.
-
- LITTLE MESS is unnoticeable in TELIX sessions; the .SLX files
- easy to overlook. Some integrity checkers can be set to
- find LITTLE MESS, but we think this very unlikely in general
- practice. LITTLE MESS is an extreme, yet intriguing example of
- a "niche" virus. LITTLE MESS is removed from TELIX directories
- by deleting all .SLC files which have an .SLX counterpart. The
- .SLX files are then renamed with .SLC extensions.
-
- LITTLE MESS cannot execute outside the TELIX environment. As
- a compiled "script," it can only operate within the TELIX
- "Go" command.
-
- The TridenT group has also produced the Coffeeshop
- (Trivia: "Coffeeshop" is a place one goes to purchase
- dope when in the Netherlands. I wonder if these guys have
- any David Peel records?) series of viruses, the advanced
- encryption device called the Trident Polymorphic Engine used in
- the Coffeeshop 2 and 3 viruses, and a number of other things.
-
- The QMOD.BAT and PCOMM.BAT files are "drop-ins" for those
- wishing to use in Leech-Zmodem with the popular Qmodem or
- ProComm Plus telecommunications softwares. QMOD presumes
- a download directory named DL off a QMODEM home directory,
- but this is easily edited to a user's taste. The key
- command after calling the Leech-Zmodem program is "c=s",
- which sets "file cancellation" to single mode. Most
- every other variable can be set by the Leech-Zmodem
- configuration program, LZMCNF.EXE. Quite naturally, once
- the Leech-Zmodem files have been copied into your
- telecommunications directory you will activate the program
- through the "external protocols" menu.
-
- For example, PCOMM.BAT would be installed by going into
- ProComm Plus's SETUP (keyboard ALT+S), and highlighting
- PROTOCOL OPTIONS. After entering that menu, the sub-menu
- EXTERNAL PROTOCOLS would be chosen. Leech-ZMODEM can be set up
- in either one of the 3 external protocol slots. In the first slot,
- setup should look like:
-
-
- Page 12
-
- A - Name...............Leech-Zmodem
- B - Type...............PROGRAM
- C - Upload Command.....(leave blank) <--Leech-Zmodem won't u/l
- D - Download Command...PCOMM.BAT (or whatever)
-
- Simple? You bet.
-
- ************************************************************
- GOSSIP WHICH COMES OUR WAY: FICTUAL FACT/FACTUAL
- FICTION?
- ************************************************************
- Virus exchange sysop Aristotle, informal head of the Vx
- echomail network, informs the Crypt Newsletter that he
- is putting his collection of over 2000 viruses up for sale
- to interested buyers. Inquiring parties will have the
- option of downloading the Aristotle collection from
- The Virus/Black Axis BBS at high speed. Aristotle tells
- us he has consulted widely with a number of law enforcement
- agencies on various aspects of the Vx network, conspiracy
- and the trade of dangerous code and has decided to charge
- for access to his code library.
-
-
- The independent comic book publishing house, Dark Horse, will
- produce a 4-book series called "Virus." "Virus" tells the
- story of an alien computer virus which commandeers a Japanese
- warship and begins conducting experiments on its crew. More
- on this when we get copies.
-
- More in the weird life of PROTO-T: A momentary fart from from
- the FidoNet, honest!
-
- "It appears as though there are several versions of [PROTO-T]
- floating around the country. The most notable being the
- one authored by Edwin Cleton. Yes! The moderator of this here echo.
- I learned this only recently...Oh well, What's the world coming to?
-
- EDWIN LIVES SOMEWHERE IN TIME....
-
-
- ELToTSiRA"
-
- In case you haven't been following the PROTO-T "story," it's
- too late now to bring you up to date, so just forget it, OK?
-
-
- 40HEX issue #9 available on good newsstands now.
-
- The Youngsters Against McAfee Instant Virus Producer is a
- virus-making tool modelled after the PS-MPC and VCL.
- The IVP, as it is called, generates TASM-compatible
- source code for as yet unscanned direct action .COM and
- .EXE-infecting viruses. Each virus listing generated is
- peppered with a number of randomly-generated "no op" codes.
- The demonstration virus included with the IVP tool scans as a
- Virus Creation Laboratory variant if the garbling "nops"
- are removed.
-
- [If you have something you think is of interest to our
- readers, pass it on and we will include it in future
- "FICTUAL FACT/FACTUAL FICTION" columns.]
-
-
- Page 13
-
- *************************************************************
- HUMOR BREAK: THREAT OR MENACE?
- *************************************************************
- A look back at March 1992 and the Michelangelo scare:
- an extract from Pulitzer-winning humorist Dave Barry's annual
- year end wrap-up (distributed by Knight-Ridder Newspapers).
-
- MARCH
- 1 -- Pat Buchanan wins the Austrian primary.
- 2 -- Saddam Hussein appears on "Larry King Live."
- 3 -- Business and academic professionals around the world are
- gripped by panic following dire warnings from numerous experts
- that tens of thousands of computers could be infected with the
- dread Michelangelo virus, set to strike on March 6.
- 4 -- A grim President Bush places U.S. armed forces on Full Red
- Alert in preparation for expected onslaught of the dread
- Michelangelo virus.
- 5 -- Highways leading from major metropolitan are hopelessly
- jammed by millions of fear-crazed motorists fleeing from the
- oncoming Michelangelo virus.
- 6 -- As predicted, the dread Michelangelo virus erupts,
- wreaking untold havoc on an estimated one computer belonging to
- Rose Deegle, of Rochester, N.Y., whose Christmas card list
- is nearly wiped out. Vice President Quayle jets in to oversee
- the relief effort.
- 8 -- Michelangelo appears on "Larry King Live."
- **************************************************************
-
-
- ROLL THE END NOTES!
-
- Thanks and a tip o' the hat go to alert Crypt Newsletter
- readers Primal Fury, Captain AeroSmith, Beach and Mr. Badger
- for their timely contributions to this issue.
-
- Software included with the Crypt Newsletter falls under
- the catch-all term dangerous code. In the hands of
- incompetents and experienced PC users, many of
- the programs can and will foul the software resources of
- of a computer, most times irretrievably. Much of the
- code supplied is designed solely for this purpose.
-
- Why then, the newsletter? There are many reasons, but one
- which sheds a little light on the matter is illustrated
- by this brief bit of e-mail from the FidoNet.
-
-
- " ..but, could you provide me with info on how I can get
- copies of existing viruses for research purposes?"
-
- As a new user you will not know that there is a rule here
- completely forbidding the trade in virus samples. I expect you
- will already have had a hostile message about baseball bats
- from kindly Mr Cleton.
-
- However, I think I am within my rights to explain. There
- is an unwritten convention here that dictates that to be come
- an accepted, respectable virus researcher you must first go to
- a Virus Exchange bulletin board or other underground outlet
- and obtain as many live virus samples as you can. Then you
- can say you already have an extensive virus library and folks
- on here will take you seriously and swap viruses with you. No
-
- Page 14
-
- one will ever admit this but it was the only way I could
- break into the field....
-
- --------------------------------------------------------------
- "I see!" said the blind man as he picked up his hammer and saw.
- --------------------------------------------------------------
-
- To assemble the software included in this issue of the newsletter,
- copy the MS-DOS program DEBUG.EXE to your current directory,
- unzip the newsletter archive into the same directory and
- type MAKE at the DOS prompt. The included batch file will
- recreate all the software with the exception of the POPOOLAR
- SCIENCE virus. DO NOT EXECUTE -=POPSCI.BAT=- IN THE SAME
- DIRECTORY AS THE REST OF YOUR NEWSLETTER FILES OR THEY STAND
- A GOOD CHANCE OF ALL BEING INSTANTLY RUINED. Move POPSCI.BAT to
- a separate directory and read the documentation before you
- begin to play with it. The A86 source listings to the
- three viruses are also included for the more experienced
- readers. If that seems like jargon to you, don't lose any
- sleep over the .A86 files.
-
- This issue of the newsletter should contain the following
- files:
-
- CRPTLT.R11 - this document
- PCOMM.BAT - ProComm external protocol batch file for
- Leech-Zmodem
- QMOD.BAT - Qmodem external protocol batch file for
- Leech-Zmodem
- LZMCNF.SCR - Leech-Zmodem CONFIG program scriptfile.
- LZM.SCR - Leech-Zmodem main executable scriptfile.
- LTLMESS.SLC - compile form of LITTLE MESS virus
- LTLMESS.SLT - SALT language source of LITTLE MESS virus.
- POPSCI.BAT - POPOOLAR SCIENCE batch file virus launcher.
- POPSCI.A86 - POPOOLAR SCIENCE virus A86 source listing.
- HITLER.A86 - HITLER virus A86 source listing.
- HITLER.SCR - HITLER virus scriptfile.
- NECRO.A86 - NECRO (SKULL) virus A86 source listing.
- NECRO.SCR - NECRO (SKULL) virus scriptfile.
- MAKE.BAT - instant "maker" for this issue's software.
- Ensure that the MS-DOS program DEBUG.EXE is in the
- machine path or current directory, before
- typing "MAKE".
-
-
- You can pick up the Crypt Newsletter at these fine BBS's, along with
- many other nifty, unique things.
-
-
- CRYPT INFOSYSTEMS 1-215-868-1823 Comment: Crypt Corporate East
- DARK COFFIN 1-215-966-3576 Comment: Crypt Corporate West
- THE HELL PIT 1-708-459-7267
- DRAGON'S DEN 1-215-882-1415
- RIPCO ][ 1-312-528-5020
- AIS 1-304-420-6083
- CYBERNETIC VIOLENCE 1-514-425-4540
- THE VIRUS 1-804-599-4152
- NUCLEAR WINTER 1-215-882-9122
- UNPHAMILIAR TERRITORY 1-602-PRI-VATE
- THE OTHER SIDE 1-512-618-0154
- MICRO INFORMATION SYSTEMS SERVICES 1-805-251-0564
- ADAM'S CONNECT POINT 1-210-783-6526
- STAIRWAY TO HEAVEN 1-913-235-8936
- THE BIT BANK 1-215-966-3812
-
- Page 15
-
-
- The Crypt Newsletter staff welcomes your comments, anecdotes,
- thoughtful articles and hate mail.
-
- You can contact us at Crypt InfoSystems or
- at CSERVE#:70743,1711 or Internet: 70743.1711@compuserve.com
-
- For those who treasure hardcopy, Crypt Newsletter is available as a
- FAX subscription: $20 for a ten issue run. It can also be had as one
- of those corporate-looking papyrus newsletters for the same price.
- All inquiries should be directed to the Crypt Newsletter e-mail
- addresses.
-
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